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Affect, Values, and Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions:
An Experimental Investigation
Dan M. Kahan, * Paul Slovic, †
Donald Braman,  John Gastil, β & Geoffrey L. Cohen χ
Despite knowing little about nanotechnology (so to speak), members of
the public readily form opinions on whether its potential risks outweigh
its potential benefits. On what basis are they forming their judgments?
How are their views likely to evolve as they become exposed to more information about this novel science? We conducted a survey experiment
(N = 1,850) to answer these questions. We found that public perceptions
of nanotechnology risks, like public perceptions of societal risks generally,
are largely affect driven: individuals’ visceral reactions to nanotechnology
(ones likely based on attitudes toward environmental risks generally) explain more of the variance in individuals’ perceptions of nanotechnology’s
risks and benefits than does any other influence. These views are not
static: even a small amount of information can generate changes in perceptions. But how those perceptions change depends heavily on individuals’ values. Using a between-subjects design, we found that individuals
exposed to balanced information polarize along cultural and political lines
relative to individuals not exposed to information. We discuss what these
findings imply for understanding of risk perceptions generally and for the
future of nanotechnology as a subject of political conflict and regulation.

1. Introduction: As Goes Berkeley, . . .?
In December 2006, Berkeley, California, became the first governmental
entity in the United States to regulate nanotechnology. Facilities that manufacture or use nanoparticles must now file reports with city officials disclosing
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“how [they] will safely handle, monitor, contain, dispose, track inventory, [and]
prevent releases” of these materials. 1
Far more remarkable, however, than the content of this (very modest)
regulation are how little time and information municipal officials needed to decide it was necessary. Having never heard of nanotechnology before the University of California proposed construction of a research laboratory, the city’s hazardous waste director immediately commenced an inquiry to determine
whether it posed a threat to public safety. “We sent them a bunch of questions
starting with: ‘What the heck is a nanoparticle?’ ” 2 Regulators were quickly able
to learn that, but not much more: “The human health impacts of nanoparticles,” the city’s Environmental Advisory Commission reported, “are very complex and are only beginning to be understood.” Nevertheless, citing concerns
that nanoparticles might “penetrate skin and lung tissue” and possibly “block
or interfere with essential reactions” inside human cells, officials concluded
that a precautionary stance was in order. 3
What should those who are interested in public attitudes toward
nanotechnology make of Berkeley’s response? Why did regulators react with
nearly instantaneous concern toward this novel form of science? Why did their
anxieties seem to grow in the face of admittedly indefinite information? How are
they, and publicly accountable officials elsewhere, likely to react as they learn
even more about this nascent technology?
We conducted a study to help answer these questions. It involved a
sample of approximately 1,800 Americans, whose knowledge of and attitudes
toward nanotechnology were assessed, both in the presence and in the absence
of information about nanotechnology’s potential risks and benefits.

1

Berkeley Municipal Code § 15.12.040.

2

Barnaby J. Feder, Teeny-Weeny Rules for Itty-Bitty Atom Clusters, N.Y. Times, § 4, Jan. 14,
2007 (quoting Nabil Al-Hadithy).

3

Memorandum from Community Environmental Advisory Commission to Mayor and City
Council, at 2 (Dec. 5, 2006).
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The results were instructive. Before being furnished with information,
the vast majority of our subjects knew little if anything about nanotechnology,
yet the vast majority of them formed an immediate opinion, one way or the
other, about whether its benefits outweighed its risks. The driving force behind
these snap judgments, we found, was affect: the visceral, emotional responses
of our subjects, pro or con, determined how beneficial or dangerous they
thought nanotechnology was likely to be—a result in keeping with the force
that affect is known to exert over perceptions of personal and societal risks
generally. 4
These instantaneous judgments were not static, however. Individuals
exposed to information on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology formed
views different from individuals not so informed. But the ways in which information influenced our subjects—whether it inclined them to see nanotechnology as more risky or more beneficial—was highly conditional on the values they
held. This finding, too, is consistent with previous work documenting the role
that different worldviews—hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and
communitarian—play in orienting persons’ assessments of the dangers different forms of commerce and technology pose to public safety. 5
These results paint a picture, then, of at least one possible future for
nanotechnology. It is one in which citizens rapidly take affect-driven positions,
which harden as they conform what they learn thereafter to their more basic
cultural attitudes toward technology and risk. The result is likely to be a state
of political polarization over the desirability of nanotechnology that very much
resembles the one that now exists other controversial environmental issues, including nuclear power and global warming. Or at least that is how things are
likely to play out absent the development of strategies that neutralize the ten-

4

See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk 403-06 (2000).

5 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of Democracy:
A Cultural Critique of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1083-88 (2006). Much of this
work is based on the ongoing research of the Cultural Cognition Project. Background on the
Project
and
access
to
related
data
and
papers
can
be
found
at
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/.
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dency of persons to assimilate information in a manner that confirms their
emotional and cultural predispositions.
The rest of this paper elaborates on these claims. We start, in part 2,
with an account of the background of our investigation of nanotechnology risk
perceptions. In part 3, we describe the hypotheses and design of our study,
and in part 4 the results. We then turn in part 5 to a discussion of the implications of our findings for the likely career of nanotechnology risk perceptions
in the United States. And finally, in part 6, we conclude.
2. Background: What We Know, What We Don’t, and Some Conjectures
Not much more is known about public perceptions of the risks of
nanotechnology than is known about nanotechnology risks themselves. A lot is
known, however, about the nature of public risk perceptions generally. When
the insights of the science of risk perception are combined with the work that
has been done on attitudes toward nanotechnology, it is possible to form some
fairly plausible conjectures about why people react the way they do to this nascent technology and how their positions are likely to evolve as more information
becomes publicly available.
The most basic insight generated by risk-perception research is that attitudes toward putatively dangerous activities—from nuclear power generation to
firearms possession to smoking—are affect driven. The visceral reactions images and emotions such activities arouse are the strongest predictor of whether
individuals view them as socially deleterious or benign. 6 Affect has been found
to operate as a heuristic substitute for more systematic forms of reasoning
when individuals have access to relatively little information or little time to assess it. 7 Affect also interacts with various other processes of cognition: emo-

6

See, e.g., P. Slovic, E. Peters, M. L. Finucane & D. G. MacGregor, Affect, Risk, and Decision
Making, 24 Health Psychol. S35 (2005); George F. Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K.
Hsee & Ned Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127 Psych. Bull. 267 (2001).

7

See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, Risk as
Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24
Risk Anal. 311-322 (2004).

-4-

tionally charged events, for example, are more likely to be noticed and recalled,
thereby biasing estimations of their likelihood; 8 feelings such as fear and hope
skew individual estimations toward the probability of adverse and favorable
outcomes; 9 the desire to avoid dissonance disposes individuals to conform their
processing of information about risks and benefits toward their feelings about a
putatively dangerous activity. 10 It has also plausibly been argued that evolutionary processes have endowed human beings with a disposition to rely on
certain emotions, such as disgust, to help them discern sources of potential
harm. 11
It stands to reason, then, that affect will influence perceptions of nanotechnology risks. The immediacy of the apprehension experienced by Berkeley
regulators and their decision to regulate on the basis of exceedingly little information about its dangers, for example, comport with an affective style of reasoning.
The findings of previous studies of nanotechnology attitudes also hint at
the role affect plays. A national survey conducted by Peter Hart Research Associates found that although a large majority of respondents reported having
heard “little” or “nothing at all” about nanotechnology before being polled, a
majority still had a position on whether its risks would outweigh its benefits. 12
Again, affect would explain why so many persons without significant knowledge
about nanotechnology would nevertheless have an opinion about how dangerous it is. An informative study by Steven Currall and fellow researchers found
that public perceptions of the risks and benefits of nanotechnology are inversely correlated—that is, that people who believe nanotechnology is beneficial

8

See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 64 (2005).

9

See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 Psych. Sci. 185 (2001).

10

See Slovic, supra note 4, at 404-05.

11

See Valerie Curtis & Adam Biran, Dirt, Disgust, and Disease: Is Hygiene in Our Genes? 44
Perspectives in Biology & Med. 17 (2001).

12

See Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., Report Findings, at 6-7 (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/98.
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also tend to believe it is risky, and vice versa. 13 Currall and his associates
characterized this result as suggesting that for ordinary people nanotechnology
“risks and benefits are both enmeshed in a complex decision-making calculus.” 14 But an alternative interpretation is that individuals’ perceptions are
simple and affective: to avoid dissonance, individuals conform their assessments of both the risks and benefits of nanotechnology to their feelings about
it. Indeed, numerous studies have shown that exactly this dynamic generates
inversely correlated judgments of risk and benefit for all manner of affectdriven risk perceptions. 15
Another important insight in the study of risk perceptions generally is
the impact of cultural outlooks. Shared systems of value invest putatively
dangerous activities with social meanings (human mastery or hubris; selfreliance or selfishness; virility or contemptible self-indulgence), which in turn
determine whether those activities generate positive affective responses (hope,
pride, admiration) or negative ones (dread, fear, disgust). 16 Shared group commitments also affect the processing of information about risk. Individuals are
more likely to seek out and to credit information about societal dangers from
those who share their basic understanding of the good life. They are also loath
to form factual beliefs that differ from those same persons, lest they be deprived of important forms of social and emotional support. 17 As a result, perceptions of what sorts of activities are dangerous, and what sorts of policies are
likely to abate those risks, tend to be uniform among persons who subscribe to
a shared cultural ethic and polarized across persons who subscribe to compet-

13

See Steven C. Currall, Eden B. King, Neal Lane, Juan Madera & Stacey Turner, What Drives
Public Acceptance of Nanotechnology? Nature Nanotechnology, Dec. 2006, at 154-55.

14

Id. at 155.

15

See generally Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The
Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. Behav. Decisionmaking 1 (2000).

16

See, e.g., Ellen M. Peters, An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Perception and Stigma Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, and Risk Perceptions in the
Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 Risk Analysis 1347 (2004).

17

See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on
Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Social Psych. 808 (2003); Serena Chen, Kimberly
Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psych. Inq. 44
(1999).
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ing ones. 18 The sum total of these and like social influences on risk perception
generate a phenomenon that can be called the “cultural cognition of risk.” 19
Drawing heavily on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas, 20 one conception of the cultural cognition of risk divides cultural outlooks along two
cross-cutting dimensions. 21 The first, “hierarchy-egalitarianism,” characterizes
the relative preference of persons for a society in which resources, opportunities, privileges and duties are distributed along fixed and differentiated lines (of
gender, race, religion, and class, for example) versus one in which those goods
are distributed without regard to such differences. The other, “individualismcommunitarianism,” characterizes the relative preferences of persons for a society in which individuals secure the conditions for their own flourishing without collective interference versus one in which the collective is charged with securing its members’ basic needs and in which individual interests are subordinated to collective ones.
Individual risk perceptions, this position asserts, reflect and reinforce
their cultural outlooks so defined. Accordingly, egalitarians and communitarians are relatively sensitive to environmental and technological risks,
abatement of which justifies regulating activities that generate inequalities and
symbolize unconstrained pursuit of individual self-interest. Because they prize
the autonomy of markets and other private orderings, individualists tend to be
dismissive of claims that commerce and industry are dangerous and worthy of
regulation. So do hierarchists, who see assertions of environmental risk as im-

18

See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71,
92-94 (2001); Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture,
and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. Res. 283 (2005).

19

See generally Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 Ann. Rev. Sociology 263 (1997) (developing theory that mechanisms of cognition mediate role between cultural commitments and
various types of perceptions); Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear
of Democracy: A Cultural Critique of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1083-88 (2006)
(applying this approach to risk perception).
20

Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, viii (1970).

21

See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic, & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race and Risk Perceptions: The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety, 4 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 465 (2007).
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plicitly challenging the authority of societal and governmental elites. 22 Hierarchists and individualists have their own risk anxieties—of market disruption
and unduly invasive restrictions of hand guns—which egalitarians and communitarians likewise dismiss. There are also issues, such as the dangers of
social deviancy, on which hierarchs and communitarians square off against
egalitarians and individualists. Work by us and by other researchers have
strongly documented these patterns of risk perception. 23
There is reason to think that cultural worldviews do—or over time will—
influence nanotechnology risks, too. In the Hart poll, for example, whites and
men were significantly less disposed to see nanotechnology as risky than African-Americans and women. 24 These demographic characteristics tend to correlate with, and thus can be seen as rough proxies for, the worldviews characterized by hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism. 25 In
addition, after respondents were furnished information about the risks and
benefits of nanotechnology, significant differences also emerged between Republicans and Democrats, affiliations that also correlate (although imperfectly 26 ) with these outlooks. 27 That the effect of information varies along demo-

22

See generally Mary Douglas & Aaron B. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (1982).
23

See e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Contemporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. Cross-Cultural Psych. 61 (1991); Ellen Peters &
Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and
Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 1427-1453 (1996); Hank
C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Waste Images of Nevada,
in Risk, Media, and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technology 107 (P. S. James Flynn, and Howard Kunreuther ed., 2001); Poortinga, Steg & Vlek, Environmental Risk Concern and Preferences for Energy-Saving Measures, 34 Environment & Behavior 455 (2002). See generally Kahan, supra note 5, at 1085-87 (describing our findings and
citing additional studies).

24

The Hart poll report notes the difference between men and women. See Hart & Assoc., supra
note 12, at 7. Our independent evaluation of the data, which we obtained from the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnologies, showed the race effect.

25

See generally Kahan et al., supra note 21.

26

See generally John Gastil, Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman & Paul Slovic, The “Wildavsky
Heuristic”: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political Opinion (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 15,
2005), available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/92/90/.

27

We observed this effect in our own multivariate regression analysis of the Hart data.

-8-

graphic and ideological lines can thus be seen as evidence of a cultural bias in
the processing of information.
Putting all this together, one can at least imagine a richer, and more detailed, picture of the formation and evolution of nanotechnology risk perceptions. On this view, individuals, particularly poorly informed ones, are likely to
form reactions that are largely affective in nature. More informed persons
might be less likely to rely on affect. But their views are even more likely to
have a recognizable cultural complexion. Indeed, one might surmise that the
effect of learning more about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology will not
be to generate consensus but rather to provoke dissensus along ideological or
cultural lines.
These are, of course, conjectures. So we devised a more rigorous empirical study to test them.
3. An Experimental Study of Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions
3.1. Hypotheses
Our study focused on two major hypotheses and a number of related
subhypotheses. The first major hypothesis was that individuals’ perceptions of
nanotechnology risks and benefits would be affect driven.
A subhypothesis was that affect toward nanotechnology would itself be
explained by individuals’ dispositions toward environmental risks generally.
Confronted with a novel form of technology, individuals, we surmised, would
likely form their affective appraisals based on whether they generally see technology as societally dangerous or beneficial. 28
In the same vein, we also predicted that affect toward nanotechnology
would reflect subjects’ cultural dispositions. Because cultural outlooks tend to

28

See generally Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American
Risk Perceptions, Affective Images and Interpretive Communities,” in Communication and Social
Change: Strategies for Dealing with the Climate Crisis (forthcoming 2007) (finding that members
of the public can be classified according to shared categories of risk perception that themselves
reflect broader values).
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influence whether an individual’s affect is negative or positive, we conjectured
that outlooks could be expected to have at least some impact on nanotechnology affect. We predicted, in particular, that hierarchical and individualist subjects would have a relatively positive affective response to nanotechnology, and
egalitarian and communitarian subjects a relatively negative one, in accord
with the dispositions of such persons toward environmental risks generally.
Our second major hypothesis was that individuals would react to information about nanotechnology risks and benefits in a manner that reflected
their cultural outlooks. The phenomenon of “biased assimilation and polarization” refers to the tendency of people who disagree on a disputed issue to construe information in a way that supports their existing views and thus to form
views that are even more divergent. 29 We predicted that subjects’ cultural predispositions toward environmental risks would bias their assimilation of information about nanotechnology risks and thus polarize subjects along cultural
lines. Specifically, we predicted that the more hierarchical and individualistic
subjects were, the more favorable their views would become as they were exposed to information, whereas the more egalitarian and communitarian subjects were, the more negative their views would become. A subhypothesis was
that individuals would become polarized along other lines characteristic of disagreements about environmental risks, including gender, race, and ideology.
3.2. Study Design
3.2.1. Sample
The sample consisted of approximately 1,850 individuals demographically weighted to reflect national representativeness. 30 They were drawn from a
29

See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Leper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 11 J. Personality & Soc.
Psych. 2098-2109 (1979).

30

Numerous studies have shown that the on-line samples and testing methods of Knowledge
Networks yield results equivalent in reliability to conventional random-digit-dial surveys. Studies based on those samples and methods are routinely published in academic journals. See
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html;
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208-28-2006.pdf A
more complete description of the composition of Knowledge Networks and of the demographic
characteristics of the sample used in this study appears in Appendix A.
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panel of on-line survey respondents assembled by Knowledge Networks for participation in scholarly public opinion analysis. The subjects were administered
an on-line survey-experiment that consisted of approximately 50 questions and
that took an average of approximately 10 minutes to complete. 31 Survey responses were collected between December 14, 2006, and December 28, 2006.
3.2.2. Measures
3.2.2.1. Cultural Worldviews
The subjects’ cultural worldviews were measured with two scales developed for use in a previous national study of cultural orientations and risk perceptions. 32 “Hierarchy-Egalitarianism” (“Hierarchy”) consisted of 12 items, and
“Individualism-Communitarianism” (“Individualism”) 18 items, designed to assess subjects’ worldviews along those two dimensions. Both were highly reliable (Hierarchy, α = .81; Individualism α = .83).
We also divided our subjects into “types” reflecting their cultural worldviews. Based on their scores relative to the median ones for Hierarchy and Individualism, individuals were designated as either “Hierarchs” or “Egalitarians,”
and as either “Individualists” or “Communitarians.” They were further divided
into four distinct types— “Hierarchical Individualists,” “Hierarchical Communitarians,” “Egalitarian Individualists, and “Egalitarian Communitarians”—based
on the combinations of these designations.
3.2.2.2. Other Individual Characteristics
Various demographic characteristics of interest were collected. These included the subjects’ races, their genders, their ages, their education levels,
their household incomes, their parental status, their political party affiliations
and their political ideologies (measured with a liberal-conservative scale). Subjects were also asked to indicate whether they “strongly disagreed,” “disagreed,”
“agreed,” [or] “strongly agreed” with the statement, “The federal government can

31

Pertinent elements of the survey instrument appear in Appendix B.

32

See generally Kahan et al., supra note 21.
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be trusted to protect the public from environmental and technological risks”
(Govtrust).
3.2.2.3. Nanotechnology
The experiment-survey instrument contained a number of items relating
to nanotechnology. One (“Nanoknow”) asked “[h]ow much have you heard
about nanotechnology before today?,” and permitted responses of “nothing at
all,” “just a little,” “some,” and “a lot.” 33 Subjects who indicated they had heard
“nothing at all” or “just a little” were classified as having “low knowledge,” those
who had heard “some” as “moderate knowledge,” and those who had heard “a
lot” as “high knowledge” with respect to nanotechnology.
Another item (“Nanoaffc”) measured respondents’ affect toward nanotechnology. Using a “bipolar” scale previously found to be a reliable and robust
measure of affective attitudes, 34 this item asked “[h]ow would you say
nanotechnology makes you feel?,” and permitted responses of “very bad,”
“bad,” “neither good nor bad,” “good,” and “very good.”
Finally, respondents’ perceptions of nanotechnology risks was measured
with an item (“Nanorisk”) that asked them “[d]o you think the risks of
nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its benefits, the risks of nanotechnology
will slightly outweigh its benefits, the benefits of nanotechnology will slightly
outweigh its risks[,] [or] the benefits of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its
risks[?]”

33

Subjects were instructed that they should refuse to answer this or any other question on
which they were “unsure.” This instruction has been found to generate the same rate of “don’t
know/unsure” responses among on-line survey respondents as permitting only a volunteered
“don’t know/unsure” response in telephone surveys. See J. Michael Dennis, Rick Li, & Cindy
Chatt, Benchmarking Knowledge Networks’ Web-Enabled Panel Survey of Selected GSS Questions Against GSS In-Person Interviews (Unpublished manuscript, Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/GSS%202002%20DK%20Rates%20on%20K
N%20Panel%20v3.pdf.

34

Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, Affective Asynchrony and the Measurement of the Affective Attitude Component, Cognition & Emotion (forthcoming 2007).
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Nanoknow and Nanorisk were adapted from the Hart survey. In contrast
to that survey, however, the nanotechnology items in our experiment-survey
instrument were introduced (as a group) with this statement:
Now we would like to know what you think about nanotechnology.
Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, predict and make things
on the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules. Materials created
with nanotechnology can often be made to exhibit very different physical,
chemical, and biological properties than their normal size counterparts.

This brief and nonjudgmental language was included with the expectation that
without at least a minimal description of nanotechnology those who responded
“nothing at all” to the prior knowledge item (“Nanoknow”) would feel it was inappropriate to offer a response to Nanorisk even if they had an opinion on
nanotechnology’s relative risks and benefits.
3.2.2.4. Other Risk Perceptions
Subjects were asked to specify whether they regarded a set of additional
activities as presenting “almost no risk,” “slight risk,” “moderate risk” or “high
risk.” These included “global warming” and “nuclear power,” which were combined into a single measure of environmental risk (“Envrisk,” α = .57).
3.2.3. Information Experiment
The subjects were divided into two groups. The “no information treatment” group was exposed to no information about nanotechnology aside from
the minimal introductory statement. The “information treatment” group received two paragraphs of additional information (the order of which was randomly varied) relating, respectively, to the benefits and risks of nanotechnology:
The potential benefits of nanotechnology include the use of nanomaterials in products to make them stronger, lighter and more effective. Some
examples are food containers that kill bacteria, stain-resistant clothing,
high performance sporting goods, faster, smaller computers, and more
effective skincare products and sunscreens. Nanotechnology also has
the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease, clean up
the environment, enhance national security, and provide cheaper energy.
While there has not been conclusive research on the potential risks of
nanotechnology, there are concerns that some of the same properties
that make nanomaterials useful might make them harmful. It is thought
that some nanomaterials may be harmful to humans if they are breathed
in and might cause harm to the environment. There are also concerns
that invisible, nanotechnology-based monitoring devices could pose a
threat to national security and personal privacy.

-13-

These statements preceded the nanotechnology risk and affect items for the information-treatment group subjects.
The rationale for dividing the subjects into two groups was to facilitate a
valid evaluation of the effect of information. The Hart survey had assessed the
evaluation of the impact of information with a within-subjects design—that is,
by re-measuring nanotechnology risk perceptions of the same subjects before
and after they received information. In such a design, changes in responses
could be thought to reflect a contrived disposition on the part of subjects to
appear open-minded and receptive to information. To avoid a confounding interpretation of this sort, we decided to use a between-subjects design—one in
which the responses of subjects who received no information would be compared to those of informed subjects who offered their responses only after receiving information.
The sizes of the two groups differed: approximately 1,500 for the noinformation treatment group and approximately 350 for the informationtreatment group. The larger sample size for the no-information group was selected in order to assure adequate power to facilitate the detection of relatively
small effect sizes in the anticipated multivariate regression analysis of
nanotechnology risk perceptions among those subjects. The smaller sample
used for the information-treatment group was anticipated to be large enough to
permit detection of the hypothesized biased-assimilation/polarization effects
across subjects of diverse cultural orientations and other characteristics.
4. Results
4.1. No-Information Treatment: An Analysis of Nanotechnology Risk
Perceptions
4.1.1. What Americans Know About Nanotechnology, and What They
Think About It
The size of the no-information treatment group (n = 1,500) made it possible to form an assessment of how much the general public in the United States
knows about nanotechnology and what they think about it. We found, consistent with the Hart survey, that the American public is largely uninformed about
this novel technology. A full 81% of our subjects reported having heard either

-14-

“nothing at all” (53%) or “just a little” (28%) about nanotechnology prior to being surveyed. Only 5% reported having heard “a lot.”

A lot
5%
Some
14%

Nothing at all
53%

Just a little
28%

Figure 1. Prior Knowledge of Nanotechnology

Nevertheless, we also found that after being supplied with a minimal and
nonjudgmental description of what nanotechnology is, the vast majority of
Americans are willing to offer an opinion about its relative risks and benefits.
Eighty-nine percent had a position one way or the other. 35 Interestingly, although divided, Americans, on the whole, seem relatively pro-nanotechnology.
A majority, 53%, indicated that they believed nanotechnology’s benefits would
either “slightly” or “strongly” outweigh its risks. Thirty-six percent indicated
that they believed that nanotechnology’s risks would either “slightly” or
“strongly” outweigh its benefits. Treating these four responses to the Nanorisk

35

This general finding—that the proportion of persons holding an opinion on nanotechnology
risks substantially exceeds the proportion who report having heard more than “a little” about it
—is also consistent with the Hart survey. In the Hart survey, however, some 47% of the respondents were “unsure” whether risks outweigh benefits. Only 11% of our respondents refused to take a position one way or the other. We attribute the difference primarily to our decision to use a brief introductory statement describing what nanotechnology is before soliciting
opinions.
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item as a four-point scale, with “1” being “risks strongly outweigh benefits” and
“4” being “benefits strongly outweigh risks,” the mean score for the sample was
2.66.
Not Sure
11%

Benefits > Risks
53%

Risks > Benefits
36%

Margin of Error ± 2.5%

Figure 2. Risks vs. Benefits, No-Information Condition

An examination of opinions among subgroups of the population (Table 1),
however, revealed somewhat more ambivalence and division. The “white male
effect” in risk perception refers to the tendency of white men to be less concerned with all manner of risk than women and minorities. 36 There is clearly a
white male effect in assessment of nanotechnology risks. Men (mean = 2.81)
and whites (mean = 2.67) were significantly more disposed to see benefits as
outweighing risks than were women (mean = 2.50) and African-Americans
(mean = 2.32), respectively. White males (mean = 2.85) were the most disposed
to see benefits as outweighing risks.
Differences among political groups appeared minimal. There was no significant difference in the evaluations of Republicans (mean = 2.66) and Democrats (mean = 2.66), for example. Surprisingly, liberals (mean = 2.78) held a
slightly more positive view about the benefits and risks of nanotechnology than

36

See Melissa Finucane, Paul Slovic, C.K. Mertz, James Flynn & Theresa A. Satterfield, Gender, Race, and Perceived Risk: The "White Male" Effect, 3 Health, Risk, & Soc’y 159 (2000); Kahan et al., supra note 21.
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conservatives (mean = 2.66), although the difference was borderline significant
(p = .10). Both conservatives and liberals had more positive views than moderates (mean = 2.57), a result that also seemed a bit surprising but not particularly meaningful.

Benefit > Risk Risk > Benefit
mean significance
2.66
Overall
53%
36%
–
Men
59%
31%
2.81
a***
Women
47%
40%
2.50
a***
Whites
54%
34%
2.67
b***
Blacks
36%
49%
2.32
b***
White Males
61%
30%
2.85
c***
White Females
46%
39%
2.46
c***
Republicans
55%
35%
2.66
Democrats
54%
37%
2.66
Liberals
58%
33%
2.78
d*, e***
Conservatives
55%
35%
2.66
d*, f***
Moderates
48%
39%
2.57
e***, f**
Hierarchs
53%
36%
2.64
Egalitarians
52%
35%
2.67
Individualists
51%
36%
2.62
Communitarians
54%
35%
2.70
Hierarch Individualists
54%
34%
2.65
Hierarch Communitarians
53%
39%
2.63
Egalitarian Individualists
47%
38%
2.56
g**
Egalitarian Communitarians
54%
33%
2.73
g**
Low Knowledge
47%
40%
2.51
h***, i***
Moderate Knowledge
80%
19%
3.18
h***
High Knowledge
83%
14%
3.33
i***
n ≈ 1,500. Shared alphabetic notation denotes significant differences in group means:
* p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .001, 2-tail.
Table 1. Risk/Benefit Perceptions by Group, No-Information Condition

Differences among culturally defined groups was also insubstantial.
There were no statistically significant differences among Hierarchs (mean =
2.64) and Egalitarians (mean = 2.67) or among Individualists (mean = 2.62)
and Communitarians (mean = 2.70). There was a statistically significant difference among Egalitarian Individualists (mean = 2.56) and Egalitarian Communitarians (mean = 2.73), suggesting a weak disposition on the part of individualists to perceive nanotechnology positively, but the difference again seemed
largely to defy meaningful interpretation.
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The most striking differences were based on subjects’ levels of (reported)
knowledge. “Low knowledge” subjects—those who indicated they had heard either “nothing at all” or “just a little”—were considerably more disposed to see
risks as outweighing benefits (mean = 2.51) than were either “moderate knowledge” (mean = 3.18) or “high knowledge” (mean = 3.33) subjects, whose respective positive views of nanotechnology benefits did not differ significantly.
This particular finding is ambiguous. It could be interpreted to mean
that exposure to information about nanotechnology tends to make persons
more disposed to see its benefits as outweighing its risks. But another possibility is that some other influence that disposes individuals to see nanotechnology
as beneficial also disposes them to learn more about it. As we will discuss
presently, results from the information-condition permit additional assessment
of this issue.
4.1.2.

Why Americans Think What They Do About Nanotechnology: The Role of Affect

To attempt to explain variation in perceptions of the risks and benefits of
nanotechnology, we conducted a multivariate regression analysis (Table 2). 37
The dependent variable was Nanorisk, reverse coded so that it measured the
degree to which subjects perceived risks as outweighing benefits. The independent variables included a range of individual characteristics that we believed might likely explain differences in nanotechnology risk perceptions, including affective responses to nanotechnology (Nanoaffc).
We entered the variables in steps to make more transparent the relative
impact of affect and other influences. In step 1, we assessed the impact of all
the independent variables other than affect. Consistent with the simple mean
scores by group, this analysis revealed that by far the biggest impact on
nanotechnology risk perceptions is how much subjects know (or report knowing) about it (Nanoknow): the more they know, the less risky they perceive
nanotechnology to be relative to its benefits. The subjects’ perceptions of other
37

Subjects who did not take a position on whether nanotechnology risks outweigh nanotechnology benefits or vice versa are of course omitted from the regression. Missing data, in this
and other regression analyses, are handled generally through pairwise deletion.
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environmental risks (Envrisk) had the next largest effect: the more concerned
subjects were with nuclear power and global warming, the more concerned
they were with the risks of nanotechnology. Not surprisingly, 38 the more subjects trusted government to regulate risks effectively (Govtrust), the less concerned they were about nanotechnology risks.
The regression analysis slightly complicated the finding of a “white male
effect” for nanotechnology risks. It confirmed that being female and being
black rather than white disposed subjects to see nanotechnology as risky, even
controlling for other influences. However, relative to whites, being a minority
other than an African-American actually predicted less concern for nanotechnology risks.
Semi-Partial Coefficients
Step 1
.062 **
-.063 ***
.058 **
.021
-.044 *
-.046 *
.013
.023
.016
.038 *
-.086 ***
-.005
.038 *
.115 ***
-.276 ***

Step 2
female
.036 *
other_minority
-.047 **
black
.040 *
age
.012
hh_income
-.035 *
education
-.047 **
parent
-.01
republican
.020
third_party
.020
conservative
.015
govtrust
-.061 ***
individ
.015
hierarch
.019
envrisk
.084 ***
nanoknow
-.164 ***
nanoaffc
-.334 ***
2
.18
.29
R
n ≈ 1,240. DV=Nano risk > benefit. * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01, 2-tail.
Table 2. Regression Analysis of Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions

Both a hierarchal cultural orientation and a conservative political ideology had small and borderline-significant effects. However, the direction of the
effects—toward more concern with nanotechnology risks—was unanticipated.

38

See Slovic, supra note 4, at 316.
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In step 2, we added the affect variable (coded toward positive feelings) to
the model. It was significant and had the predicted effect on nanotechnology
risk perceptions: the more positive subjects’ affect toward nanotechnology was,
the less risky they perceived it to be relative to its benefits. Indeed, affect
proved to be the largest predictor, with an effect size double that of prior
knowledge. Adding affect to the model increased the model’s explanatory
power by approximately 60%, and subsumed the (odd) effects of both cultural
orientation and political ideology. Overall, then, the results strongly confirm the
first main hypothesis, namely, that perceptions toward nanotechnology risks
would be affect driven.
Race and gender effects persisted, as did the effect of government trust,
after the inclusion of affect. So did the effect of education: the more educated
the subjects were, the less concerned they were about nanotechnology risks
holding all other influences constant.
4.1.3.

Explaining Affect

We performed additional regression analyses to attempt to determine the
source of the variation in our subjects’ affective appraisals of nanotechnology
(Table 3). 39 Environmental risk perception had the predicted effect on affect:
holding all other influences constant, the more concern our subjects had about
global warming and nuclear power, the more negative their affect was toward
nanotechnology. The first subhypothesis was thus confirmed.

39

Subjects who did not take a position on whether nanotechnology risks outweigh nanotechnology benefits or vice versa are omitted from the regression. Some of these subjects, however,
did respond to the nanotechnology affect item. Including them in the regression does not produce any materially different results, with the exception that the coefficient for parent becomes
borderline significant.
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Semi-Partial Coefficients
female
-.083 ***
other_minority
.040 *
black
-.062 **
age
-.018
hh_income
.036
education
-.005
parent
-.030
republican
-.005
third_party
.011
conservative
-.061 **
govtrust
.063 **
individ
.056 **
hierarch
-.059 **
envrisk
-.082 ***
nanoknow
.288 ***
2
R
.17
n ≈ 1,240. DV=Nano risk > benefit. * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤
.05, ***p ≤ .01, 2-tail.
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Nanotechnology Affect

The second subhypothesis was that cultural worldviews would influence
affect toward nanotechnology. Both Hierarchy and Individualism did have a
significant effect. However, the sign of Hierarchy was negative, indicating that
the more hierarchical our subjects were the more negative their affect and the
more egalitarian the more positive. This particular result was contrary to our
hypothesis.
Certain other demographic characteristics also had an effect. Thus being
female and black both predicted negative affect. So (unexpectedly) did conservative political ideology.
By far the largest influence on affect was prior knowledge. The more subjects reported having heard about nanotechnology before being surveyed, the
more positive their affective appraisal of it.
4.2. Information Treatment: The Impact of Information
By comparing nanotechnology risk assessments across the informationtreatment and no-information treatment groups, we were able to assess the
impact of information exposure on attitudes toward nanotechnology risk perceptions. The results showed that information has a profoundly ambiguous effect.
-21-

4.2.1. Main Effects: Information Doesn’t Matter
The main effect of information exposure—that is, the overall effect of information exposure across the treatment groups—is essentially nil. The respective mean evaluations of nanotechnology risks of the informationtreatment group (2.65) and the no-information group (2.66) are statistically insignificant. Because the sample sizes of the two groups generated a likelihood
of over 90% for detecting even a small effect size at an alpha of .10, 40 it can be
fairly concluded that balanced information of the sort reflected in our experimental manipulation does not affect opinions toward nanotechnology in the
general population.
Not Sure
5%

Not Sure
11%

Benefits >
Risks
53%

Risks >
Benefts
36%

Risks >
Benefts
38%

Benefits >
Risks
57%

Information

No Information

Figure 3. Views of Subjects Across Conditions

Consistent with this finding, the overall percentages of subjects in the information group who took the position either that benefits would outweigh
risks (57%) or that risks would outweigh benefits (38%) were quite comparable
to those in the no-information condition (53% and 36%, respectively). Not surprisingly, the percentage of subjects in the information condition who did not
have a view on the relative preponderance of risks and benefits (5%) was less
than half that in the no-information (11%), a difference that was significant at
p ≤ .01.

40

See Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 33, tbl 2.3.3 (1988).
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The absence of a main effect casts at least modest doubt on the proposition—suggested by the high correlation between prior knowledge and the view
that benefits predominate over risks in the no-information condition—that exposure to information makes individuals less concerned about nanotechnology
risks. As in the no-information condition, the vast majority of subjects in the
information condition, 78%, reported having heard either “nothing at all” (52%)
or “just a little” (26%) before the study. Accordingly, if learning about
nanotechnology does dispose persons to a more positive view, one might well
have expected a sample so dominated by persons without substantial prior
knowledge to shift toward a more positive view upon exposure to information.
4.2.2. Individual Differences: Biased Assimilation and Polarization
When one examines the impact of information on subgroups, however, a
very different story emerges. Examining differences between relevant groups of
interest (Table 4), 41 it is clear that exposure to balanced information did have a
very profound impact on attitudes toward nanotechnology. However, what that
impact is—whether information inclined subjects to see risks predominating
over benefits or vice versa—depended on the group to which they belonged.

41

For comparing groups, we evaluated the relative differences in the means of groups of interest across conditions. For example, whereas the difference between Hierarchs and Egalitarians
was -.03 in the no-information condition, it was .14 in the information condition, generating a
.17 change in the difference of the two groups’ scores. The differences between the two means
in the two conditions were converted into z scores, the differences between which were tested
for statistical significance. See generally Cohen, supra note 40, at 110-11, 139-40. Because
the sign of the differences in means were hypothesized in advance for the groups of interest, we
used one-tailed p value to measure significance.
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Mean Benefit/Risk Perception
No Info Group
With Info Group
Significance
Overall
2.66
2.65
–
Men
2.81
2.91
Women
2.50
2.45
Whites
2.67
2.76
a**
Blacks
2.32
2.02
a**, b**, c**
White Males
2.85
2.93
b**
White Females
2.46
2.60
c**
Republicans
2.66
2.74
Democrats
2.66
2.62
Liberals
2.78
2.62
d**
Conservatives
2.66
2.71
d**
Moderates
2.57
2.55
Hierarchs
2.64
2.72
e*
Egalitarians
2.67
2.58
e*
Individualists
2.62
2.73
f**
Communitarians
2.70
2.54
f**
Hierarchal Individualists
2.65
2.81
g**, h**
Hierarchical Communitarians
2.63
2.47
g**
Egalitarian Individualists
2.56
2.60
Egalitarian Communitarians
2.73
2.57
h**
Low Knowledge
2.51
2.50
Moderate Knowledge
3.18
3.10
High Knowledge
3.33
3.14
Shared alphabetic notation indicates significant difference in differences between mean scores of
groups across conditions: * p ≤ .10, ** p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01, 1-tail.
Table 4. Differences in Benefit/Risk Perceptions Across Treatment Groups

4.2.2.1. Impact on Culturally Defined Groups
We hypothesized that information exposure would generate a “biased assimilation and polarization effect” along cultural lines. That is, we predicted
that individuals would assimilate balanced information in a way biased by their
cultural predispositions toward environmental risks generally. This hypothesis
was strongly confirmed by the data. Thus, whereas hierarchs (2.64), egalitarians (2.67), individualists (2.62) and communitarians (2.70) all had comparable
mean evaluations in the no-information condition, these types diverged relative
to one another in expected directions—Hierarchs (2.72) and individualists
(2.73) toward benefit, and egalitarians (2.58) and communitarians (2.54) toward risk—in the information condition (Figure 4).

-24-

2.80

Benefits > Risks

2.75

Individualists
Hiearchs

Mean Evaluation

2.70

2.65

2.60

Egalitarians

2.55

Communitarians

Risks > Benefits
2.50

no information

information

Figure 4. Impact of Information Across Condition by Dimension of Cultural Worldview

We saw a similar effect across subjects divided into the four cultural
types formed by the overlap of the Hierarchy-Egalitarian and IndividualismCommunitarian worldview dimensions. Although not significantly different
from each other in the no-information condition (Table 1), Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists assumed their characteristically risksensitive and risk-skeptical positions, respectively, in the information condition
(Table 4, Figure 5). Hierarchical Communitarians and Hierarchical Individualists also displayed a biased-assimilation/polarization effect, suggesting that a
combination of hierarchical and individualistic views most powerfully disposed
subjects to be receptive to the benefits of nanotechnology.
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2.9

benefits outweigh risks
Hierarchal Individualists

2.8

Mean Evaluation

2.7

Egalitarian Individualists

2.6

Egalitarian Communitarian
2.5

Hierarchical
Communitarian
2.4

risks outweigh benefits
2.3

no information

information

Figure 5. Impact of Information Across Condition by Culture Type

4.2.2.2. Impact on Politically Defined Groups
We observed a similar biased-assimilation/polarization effect among subjects divided into ideological subgroups. Whereas liberals had proven (somewhat surprisingly) more disposed to see benefits than risks relative to conservatives in the no-information condition (Table 1)—an effect that weakly persisted in a multivariate regression analysis before the addition of affect as an
independent variable (Table 2)—the two groups traded places in the information condition (Table 4, Figure 6). This result confirmed our subhypothesis
that biased assimilation and polarization would be observed along other relevant lines in addition to cultural ones.
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2.90

Benefits outweigh Risks

2.80

Conservatives
Mean Evaluation

2.70

Liberals
2.60

Moderates

2.50

Risks outweigh Benefits
2.40

no information

information

Figure 6. Impact of Information Across Condition by Ideology

Individuals who identified as Democrats and Republicans in the information condition also polarized relative to their counterparts in the no-information
condition (Table 4), but the difference was not statistically significant (p = .11).
This finding, of course, is not tantamount to saying that our experiment found
that information does not generate divisions among individuals based on party
affiliation. On the contrary, there is an 89% likelihood that the effect observed
in the data is a real one. Moreover, although the power of our sample makes it
very unlikely that we would have failed to observe a statistically significant effect in our experiment were cable of producing one, we would by no means be
surprised if a stronger manipulation—e.g., information framed in a more opinionated and argumentative form—generated a statistically significant finding of
polarization among Democrats and Republicans.

-27-

4.2.2.3. Impact on Race and Gender Groups
We also found biased assimilation and polarization along race and gender lines. Whites and African-Americans in the no-information condition held
significantly different perceptions of the relative predominance of nanotechnology risks and benefits (Table 1). That division grew in intensity (Table 4, Figure
7) in the information condition. This result also confirmed our subhypothesis
that there would be a biased-assimilation/polarization effect along lines in addition to culture.
2.90

Benefits outweigh risks
2.80

Whites
2.70

Mean Evaluations

2.60

2.50

2.40

2.30

2.20

2.10

2.00

Blacks

Risks outweight benefits
no information

information

Figure 7. Impact of Information Across Condition by Race

Men and women also displayed a biased-assimilation/polarization effect
(Table 4), but as in the case of Democrats and Republicans, the difference was
significant at only p = .11. We again note that this finding should not be interpreted to mean that we found that men and women do not polarize, much less
that they reacted similarly, to information about nanotechnology’s risks and
benefits.
Among whites, however, it seems fair to conclude that there is not a biased-assimilation/polarization effect across genders. As in the information-
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condition, white males (mean = 2.93) and white females (mean = 2.60) held
significantly different views (p = .01) of the risks and benefits of nanotechnology in the information condition (Table 4). However, the difference between the
two, rather than increasing across the conditions, actually grew smaller (Table
4), although by an amount that itself did not even approach statistical significance (p = .34). We were surprised by this result, which defied one of our subhypotheses about the effect of information.
4.2.2.4. Impact on Groups Defined by Prior Knowledge of Nanotechnology
It is also fair to say that information exposure does not close the gap between persons with little prior knowledge and those with more. Differences
among persons with low knowledge, on the one hand, and those with moderate
and high knowledge, on the other, remained significant in the information condition (Table 4, Figure 8). More interestingly, the difference in the mean
evaluations of low-knowledge and moderate- and high-knowledge groups also
did not even approach statistical significance. 42 The only reason the difference
between these groups narrowed, moreover, was that subjects with moderate or
high knowledge in the information condition were more concerned about risks
than were their counterparts in the no-information condition, although the difference was not significant.
As noted, the strong correlation in the no-information condition between
prior knowledge and a positive attitude toward nanotechnology risks and benefits was subject to two interpretations: that knowledge disposes persons to a
favorable view; or that persons disposed to a favorable view by some other influence are disposed to learn more (or at least report knowing more) about
nanotechnology. The observed failure of information exposure to narrow the
gap between low-knowledge subjects, on the one hand, and moderate- and
high-knowledge subjects, on the other, in the information condition strongly
supports the latter view.

42

Comparing those who reported knowing “just a little” or “nothing” with those who reported
knowing “a little” or “nothing,” on the one hand, with those who knew “some” or “a lot,” on the
other, the value of p, 1-tailed, was .32.
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Figure 8. Impact of Information Across Condition by Prior Knowledge Level

5. What We Now Know, What We Still Don’t, Plus Some More Conjectures About Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions
We began with some questions about the formation and evolution of
nanotechnology risk perceptions. Based on our study results, we now venture
some answers.
5.1. What Explains Existing Public Reactions to Nanotechnology
Risks?
Individuals, even ones who admittedly know little about nanotechnology,
have views about the risks and benefits of this emerging science. How do they
form them?
The answer, our study demonstrates, is affectively. As they do for myriad other putatively dangerous activities, individuals form an instantaneous reaction to nanotechnology that then guides their appraisal of its risks and benefits. Indeed, we found that this emotional response to nanotechnology better
explains differences in individuals’ opinions than does any other factor, includ-30-

ing their race or gender, their level of education, their income, their political
and cultural commitments, their trust in government, and their level of knowledge about nanotechnology.
This finding, of course, raises the question, what accounts for individuals
affective reactions to nanotechnology? Why are some people positively disposed, and others negatively disposed, toward it?
Our study suggests supplies at least some partial answers. One important influence, we found, was how individuals perceive other types of environmental risks, including nuclear power and global warming. It seems quite
plausible, in particular, that most people, lacking much information about this
novel form of technology, form an instantaneous reaction to it based on their
views about technology and environmental risk more generally. It’s only a
guess, but we suspect individuals’ reactions to the word technology itself might
well determine their affective response toward nanotechnology, at least before
they have had a chance to learn much about it.
5.2. How Is the Public Likely to React to Additional Information
About Nanotechnology Risks?
One might suppose that as members of the public learn more about
nanotechnology their assessments of its risk and benefits should converge.
Our results suggest that exactly the opposite is likely to happen.
Specifically, we found that how people react to information depends
largely on their values. Individuals who hold values that predispose them to
credit claims of environmental risk generally tend to become alarmed, whereas
those who hold values that predispose them to dismiss claims of environmental
risk generally tend to be become reassured, as they are exposed to balanced
information about nanotechnology’s risks and benefits. Thus, individuals who
are relatively hierarchical and individualistic, on the one hand, and those who
are relatively egalitarian and communitarian, on the other, are likely to process
information in a biased way that polarizes them. By the same token, people
who describe themselves as liberals are likely to diverge from people who describe themselves as conservatives.
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This finding is of general importance, we believe, in the study of public
risk perceptions. Scholarship in this field is dominated by two competing theories. 43 The “rational weigher” theory holds that people, in aggregate and over
time, generally process information about risk in a manner that promotes their
expected utility. 44 The “irrational weigher” theory, in contrast, holds that individuals lack the capacity to process information about risk in this way because
of cognitive biases and other forms of bounded rationality. 45
Neither of these theories can explain our findings. The rational-weigher
theory assumes that people value protection from risk at different levels, but
nothing in it suggests that people with different cultural values will draw different inferences from information about whether a technology is risky. And
unless we make the implausible assumption that persons of different cultural
outlooks differ in the extent of their ability to surmount limits on human cognition, there is likewise nothing in the irrational-weigher theory that would predict that persons of differing cultural outlooks will construe information about
risks and benefits differently.
This phenomenon is more readily explained by a third model, which we
have called the “cultural evaluator” theory of risk perception. 46 This theory
says that individuals don’t simply weigh risks, whether rationally or irrationally, but rather evaluate what one position or another on those risks will signify
about how society should be organized. What individuals learn, then, when
they are exposed to information is not so much how a putatively dangerous activity will advance their utility understood in narrow instrumental terms, but
rather what position with respect to that activity will best express their cultural
identities. 47 In connection with nanotechnology, our findings suggest that even
minimal exposure to information (information that on its face has nothing to do

43

See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 1074-76.

44

See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace
(1983).

45

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8.

46

See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 1087-88.

47

Cf. Cohen, supra note 17 (developing this point in connection with political opinions generally).
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with culture!) is sufficient to enable people of shared cultural orientations to
figure out what that position is.
Nevertheless, our findings do reveal at least one interesting puzzle.
There is clearly a positive correlation in general between how much people
know—or at least report knowing—and the view that nanotechnology’s benefits
outweigh its risks. At first glance, this appears to imply that people become
more favorably disposed to nanotechnology the more they know about it. But
this interpretation is almost certainly incorrect, or at least unduly simplistic.
As our own results demonstrate, people with different values react in divergent
ways—some negatively, some positively—to the same information. In addition,
considering only how much people knew prior to the study, exposing illinformed people to information did nothing to narrow the gap between their
relatively negative view of nanotechnology and the relatively positive view of
persons who describe themselves as well-informed.
Under these circumstances, the most convincing conclusion is that the
relationship between prior knowledge and a positive view of nanotechnology is
spurious. Some other influence is moving individuals who are otherwise positively disposed to nanotechnology to learn more about it. The mystery, of
course, is what that influence is.
Discovering how predispositions toward putatively dangerous activities
motivate people’s own efforts to learn about that activity would be a major advance in the science of public risk perception. Precisely because it is novel,
nanotechnology furnishes an excellent focus for research on this question.
6. As Goes Berkeley, So Goes the Nation? Not Necessarily
Reacting quickly and on the basis of very little information, government
officials in Berkeley decided that regulation of nanotechnology was appropriate
to safeguard the public. Should we expect democratically accountable officials
elsewhere to follow suit? The answer is, it depends.
It depends, for one thing, on the cultural and political makeup of those
communities. We suspect that Berkeley reacted the way it did because a disproportionately large portion of its population subscribes to egalitarian and
communitarian worldviews. Indeed, it was probably his experience at the Uni-33-

versity of California, Berkeley, that moved political scientist Aaron Wildavsky,
one of the founders of the cultural theory of risk, to draw a connection between
an egalitarian, collectivist orientation and sensitivity to environmental risk. 48
The American population as a whole, however, is culturally diverse. In other
localities, ones that are more inclined toward hierarchy and individualism, the
impulse to regulate nanotechnology will surely be much less intense.
What does this mean, though, about regulation of nanotechnology at the
national level, where most significant environmental law is formed? A distinct
possibility is that nanotechnology, as it assumes a bigger profile (!) in the public imagination, will become a subject of increasing division. After all, we were
able to generate cultural and ideological polarization among our subjects using
balanced information. Because individuals in the real world are much more
likely to select information in a biased fashion that matches their cultural and
political dispositions, 49 one might anticipate even more extreme polarization
outside the lab. Nanotechnology, on this view, could go the route of nuclear
power and other controversial technologies, becoming a focal point of culturally
infused political conflict.
But that admittedly bleak outcome isn’t a certainty, either, in our view.
The cultural cognition of risk suggests that individuals are likely to respond to
risks in a way that expresses their values. But nothing in the theory implies
that those responses are somehow fixed in some way that defies the power of
society itself to manage.
Indeed, there have been instances in which democratically accountable
officials have forged conditions enabling citizens of opposing cultural views to
converge on appropriate risk-abatement policies. 50 These success stories,
48

See Douglas & Wildavsky, supra note 22.

49

See Braman et al., supra note 18.

50

See Kahan et al., supra note 5, at 1097-98; see also Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a
Better Gun Debate, 55 Emory L.J. 569, 588-98 (2006); cf. Geoffrey Cohen, David Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Michelle McGoey, Lillian Hsu, & Lee Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: SelfAffirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility, J. Personality & Social
Psych. (forthcoming 2007); Geoffrey L. Cohen, J. Aronson & C. M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to
Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 Personality and Social Psych.
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however, reinforce the major conclusion of our study: that mere dissemination
of scientifically sound information is not by itself sufficient to overcome the divisive tendencies of cultural cognition. Those in a position to educate the public—from government officials to scientists to members of industry—must also
intelligently frame that information in ways that make it possible for persons of
diverse cultural orientations to reconcile it with their values.
It’s not clear whether the nation will go the way of Berkeley—or for that
matter, even where Berkeley itself will go—on nanotechnology. What is clear,
however, is society’s desperate need for a new science of “democratic risk deliberation” that makes it possible to identify regulatory policies that simultaneously promote the welfare and affirm the values of a culturally diverse citizenry.

Bull. 1151 (2000) (finding that self-affirmation promotes willingness to consider information
that challenges beliefs held by one’s ideological reference group).
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Appendix A
Knowledge Networks Panels and Sample for this Study
1. Knowledge Networks
Knowledge Networks (http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public
opinion research firm with offices located throughout the United States. It
maintains an active respondent pool of some 40,000 persons who are recruited
to participate in on-line surveys and experiments administered on behalf of
academic and governmental researchers and private businesses. Knowledge
Network respondents agree to participate in three to four surveys per month in
exchange for Internet access and other forms of compensation. It uses recruitment and sampling methods that assure a diverse sample that is demographically representative of the U.S. population. Numerous studies have concluded that on-line testing of Knowledge Network samples generates results
equivalent in their reliability to conventional random-digit-dial surveys
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html, and studies using Knowledge Networks facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed academic
journals
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208
-28-2006.pdf).
2. Demographic composition of sample for this study
a. Total number of subjects: 1,862.
b. Gender: 51% female, 49% male.
c. Race: 72% white, 10.1% African-American.
d. Average age: 46.4 years.
e. Median household income: $35,000 to $40,000.
f. Median education level: Some college.
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Appendix B
Select Experiment Survey Instrument Items
1. Cultural Orientation Scales
Four-point response scale for all items: Strongly Disagree, Disagree,
Agree and Strongly Agree.
Individualism-Solidarism Scale
lives.

1.

IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday

2. SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.
3. IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.
4. IPRIVACY.
their lives.

The government should stop telling people how to live

5. SPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society's
goals, even if that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.
6. SLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so they don't get in the way of what's good for society.
7. SNEEDS. It's society's responsibility to make sure everyone's basic
needs are met.
8.

INEEDY. It's a mistake to ask society to help every person in need.

9. SRELY. People should be able to rely on the government for help
when they need it.
10. IRESPON. Society works best when it lets individuals take responsibility for their own lives without telling them what to do.
11. ITRIES. Our government tries to do too many things for too many
people. We should just let people take care of themselves.
12. IFIX. If the government spent less time trying to fix everyone's problems, we'd all be a lot better off.
13. IENJOY. People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy
their wealth as they see fit.
14. IMKT. Free markets—not government programs—are the best way to
supply people with the things they need.
15. IPROFIT. Private profit is the main motive for hard work.
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16. IGOVWAST. Government regulations are almost always a waste of
everyone's time and money.
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism Scale
1.
country.

HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this

2. HREVDIS1. Nowadays it seems like there is just as much discrimination against whites as there is against blacks.
3. EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of
wealth was more equal.
4. ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between
the rich and the poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.
5. EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in our society.
6. HREVDIS2. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other
groups don't want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.
7. HCHEATS. It seems like the criminals and welfare cheats get all
the breaks, while the average citizen picks up the tab.
8. EDIVERS. It's old-fashioned and wrong to think that one culture's set of values is better than any other culture's way of seeing the
world.
9.

HWMNRTS. The women's rights movement has gone too far.

10. ESEXIST. We live in a sexist society that that is fundamentally
set up to discriminate against women.
11. HTRADFAM. A lot of problems in our society today come from
the decline in the traditional family, where the man works and the woman
stays home.
12. HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.
13. EROUGH. Parents should encourage young boys to be more sensitive and less rough and tough.
2. Government Trust Item
GOVTRUST. The federal government can be trusted to protect the public
from environmental and technological risks. [Strongly Disagree, Disagree,
Agree, Strongly Agree]
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3. Environmental Risk Perception Items
How much risk do you believe each of the following poses to the safety or
health of people in our society? [Almost No Risk, Slight Risk, Moderate Risk,
High Risk]
GLOBWARM. Global Warming
...
NUKEPOW. Nuclear Power
4. Nanotechnology Items
General Introduction and knowledge item
INTRO9. Now we would like to know what you think about nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, predict and make things on
the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules. Materials created with
nanotechnology can often be made to exhibit very different physical, chemical,
and biological properties than their normal size counterparts.
NANOKNOW. How much have you heard about nanotechnology before
today? [Nothing at All, Just a Little, Some, A Lot]
Information Manipulation
The potential benefits of nanotechnology include the use of nanomaterials in products to make them stronger, lighter and more effective. Some
examples are food containers that kill bacteria, stain-resistant clothing,
high performance sporting goods, faster, smaller computers, and more
effective skincare products and sunscreens. Nanotechnology also has
the potential to provide new and better ways to treat disease, clean up
the environment, enhance national security, and provide cheaper energy.
While there has not been conclusive research on the potential risks of
nanotechnology, there are concerns that some of the same properties
that make nanomaterials useful might make them harmful. It is thought
that some nanomaterials may be harmful to humans if they are breathed
in and might cause harm to the environment. There are also concerns
that invisible, nanotechnology-based monitoring devices could pose a
threat to national security and personal privacy.
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Affect Item
NANOAFFECT. How would you say nanotechnology makes you feel? [very
bad, bad, neither good nor bad, good, very good]
Risk/Benefit Item
NANORISK. Do you think
(1) the risks of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its benefits
(2) the risks of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its benefits
(3) the benefits of nanotechnology will slightly outweigh its risks
(4) the benefits of nanotechnology will greatly outweigh its risks

-40-

